Chart 2. Consumer Debt/Disposable Income ratio, 197072009.
Data source: Bloomberg
Chart 2 shows that consumer credit started to decouple from disposable income in mid 1990s when equity market rate of growth has increased. To account for possible structural change in the rate of growth in equity market the dummy regression model is applied. Results in Table 1 confirm that there has been indeed a significant change in the pre and post 1995 equity price growth rates.
Table1
The following model is proposed: lnS&Pt=α1+ α2Dt+β1t+ β2(Dt*tt)+Ct; Regressand is the logarithm of Y and the regressor is "time," which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy Takes the value of 0 for older subperiod and 1 for latter subperiod. Subperiods 19907 1995 and 199572000, monthly Results show that both diffferencial intercept and slope coefficients are statistically significant, strongly suggesting that the growth rate of S&P Index for two sample periods differ. Since equity income is part of consumer wealth (household worth, as in Federal Reserve form B.100 Flow of Funds release) it comes at no surprise that surge in wealth is caused by S&P index trend change.
We test for the structural shift in consumer credit with benchmark year 1995 2 . Results presented in Table 2 in reconfirm for structural change in 1995. Table 2 The following model is proposed: CCt=α1+ α2Dt+β1t+ β2(Dt*tt)+Ct; Regressand is the Y and the regressor is "time," which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy Takes the value of 0 for older subperiod and 1 for latter subperiod. The 2 nd benchmark candidate for structural change is expected to be year 2000 3 , when GlassSteagall act has been repealed. Initial assumption has been related to consumption financed with debt or bank debt (which is the asset side of the banking sector). In order to account for possible policy shift after the Glass-Steagall act has been repealed at the end of 1999 4 the analogue of the Chow test 5 via dummy variables is employed. Results are presented in Table 3 . Table 3 The following model is proposed: BAt=α1+ α2Dt+β1GDP+ β2(Dt*GDPt)+Ct; Regressand is the Y and the regressor is "time," which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy Takes Table 4 . 4 The repeal enabled commercial lenders such as Citigroup, which was in 1999 the largest U.S. bank by assets, to underwrite and trade instruments such as mortgage7backed securities and collateralized debt obligations and establish so7called structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, that bought those securities. It was originally introduced in order to separate bank types according to their business (commercial and investment banking) in 1933 to exclude the possibility of commercial banks being too exposed to risky assets.
5 Gregory C. Chow, "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions," Econometrica, vol. 28, no. 3, 1960, pp. 591-605. Table 4 The following model is proposed: lnLOGDIt=α1+ α2Dt+β1t+Ct; Regressand is the logarithm of Y and the regressor is "time," which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy
Takes the value of 0 for older subperiod and 1 for latter subperiod. Table 5 . and aggregate real net wealth in the long term that is augmented by a split between changes in tangible wealth and financial wealth in the short term. What they find is that when financial liberalization takes place, the coefficient on human wealth (i.e. income) may be reduced, as scope for borrowing means consumption is less closely tied to current income. Furthermore, the weights on financial and non financial nonhuman wealth could change with liberalization. When households are constrained in their borrowing, direct liquidity of the components of wealth will be crucial for their effect on consumption. A lower weight would be anticipated for less liquid assets and especially for tangible wealth. When there are no credit constraints, as in a liberalized financial system, consumers can borrow to cover shortfalls in income and the ability to consume out of wealth, and in particular illiquid wealth. Higher wealth effects, especially in the short run dynamics of adjustment, are thus likely both for illiquid financial assets (equities, bonds, pension assets) and non financial tangible wealth. Byrne and Davis (2003) highlighted that illiquid as well as liquid financial wealth is likely to become important in determining consumption in the G77, and indeed showed in rolling regressions that there has been a rise in the long run impact of 6 Similar studies have been performed by Davis and Palumbo's (2001) study of the US consumption function, which attempted to determine whether changes in wealth as well as income affect the growth rate of consumer spending. Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) also examined wealth effects in a quarterly loglinear long7run US consumption relationship and found a common trend and a statistically significant wealth and income effect (Barrell and Davis 2007) illiquid financial wealth on consumption. Modelling the G75, Barrell and Davis (2004) highlighted that absence of credit constraints also affects non7financial tangible wealth. The incidence of liquidity constraints was considered to be shown inter alia by the relative size of income and wealth terms in the consumption function, which was a crucial difference between their estimates over 198072001 for less liberalised countries such as Germany and Japan vis a vis France, the UK and US. Meanwhile, tangible wealth was generally significant in both the short and long run.
Jaewoo, Rabanal and Sandri (2010) found that wealth effect was a primary factor behind the rapid decline in the U.S. saving rate (raise in consumption rate) in the late 1990s. They found that high7 wealth groups which benefited most from raising wealth decreased substantially their saving rate, while low7wealth groups changed little or even increased their saving rate. (2005)), due to a range of factors such as the rise in average household income, the increase in the proportion of working age population, and an increase in precautionary savings with the rise in the uncertainties during reforms (especially that of state7 owned enterprises) and inadequate public provision of pensions, healthcare, and education. While there is little doubt that these factors could be important in explaining the rise in the household saving rate, it is less convincing that these are the main reasons for the decline in the consumption share. In fact, data suggests that the increase in saving alone explains only a small fraction of the decline in the consumption share. The rise in household saving rate of 5 percentage points since the early 1990s can only explain 1 percentage of the 9 percentage points decline in the share of consumption that has occurred since then. During the same time the share of household income in GNP declined by 8 percentage points. The decline in household income's share occurred across all major sub7categories, but particularly in wages, which, unsurprisingly, is the largest component of income. The shares of investment income and government transfers also fell. Given that the decline in wage income was the largest contributory factor, it may be tempting to seek an answer in China's labor market. With 1007150 million workers either unemployed or underemployed, it is perhaps easy to argue that this slack in the labor market has prevented wages from rising as fast as productivity, leading to the continued decline in the share of wage income. If one adds to that some degree of monopolistic power in the hands of the employers and ineffective worker protection, then it is even easier to see why workers have not benefited from the huge productivity gains the economy has enjoyed. Aziz and Cui (2007) has shown that China's underdeveloped financial sector and persistent and rising difficulty for average firms to obtain financing has played a major role in explaining the co7 movements in employment, household income, and consumption over the last two decades.
Emerging market perspective
Specifically, Chinese firms rely on bank financing for working capital to pay wages and other current expenditure, where they are credit constrained. These borrowing constraints act like taxes on labor input that discourage the use of labor and create a wedge between the market wage rate and the marginal product of labor. Because of this wedge, the labor share in national income is less than its technologically determined share and the more difficult it is for firms to borrow, the larger is this wedge and lower is labor share. The paper showed that since the mid71990s, pressures to reform forced Chinese banks to become more conservative in their lending operations to avoid creating new non7performing loans, which tightened borrowing constraints of firms, leading to a decline in the wage share. The declining share of wage income, however, would not necessarily have led to such a steep fall in household income share, if rising profits were distributed to households. This did not happen in China for several reasons. First, despite some listing in domestic stock markets, ownership of Chinese firms is not widely held, either directly or indirectly (through institutional investors and pension funds), by households. Second, even for firms that are listed, weak corporate governance and minority shareholding rights have allowed firms to accumulate profit instead of distributing dividends. A string of scandals in the past few years associated with poor supervision of brokerage firms led to a protracted period of depressed equity prices and limited transactions such that households who owned shares did not benefit from underlying capital gains. Third, the government still retains considerable ownership of the corporate sector. In most countries, this has been a conduit of indirectly transferring corporate profit to households. State7owned enterprises (SOEs) pay dividends to the government, which uses the funds to provide goods such as education and health that are essentially private goods, and welfare payments. In China, SOEs do not pay dividends to the government, such that this conduit of profit transfer has been closed. Lastly, bank deposits are the main vehicle of savings of Chinese households. However, the interest rate on household deposits has been capped by the government.
Consequently, the share of interest earnings has declined over the years. China's banks have, of course, enjoyed higher interest rate margins. However, with much of the banking sector, burdened with high non7performing loans, under7capitalized, and under7provisioned until only last year, the higher interest margin has, for all practical purposes, ended up as being "transfers" from households to corporations. For these reasons and unlike in many other countries, the rise in corporate profits did not translate into higher household income in China. The comparison with international experience is striking. During the past decade, less than 8 percent of households' disposable income came from investments (including profit, interest rate, etc). This is one of the lowest in the world.
Data source: Aziz and Cui (2007) The nexus between financial sector development and growth is a long standing branch of economics literature. However, much of this literature, especially on the empirical front, has focused on the role played by financial intermediaries in mobilizing savings and some on their role in allocating savings. On the first role in China, earlier studies found that the banking sector did not contribute that much to growth through resource mobilization and allocation (see e.g., Aziz and Duenwald (2002)). Instead, bank financing was largely concentrated in the more sluggish state7 owned enterprises, which could have aided growth indirectly by helping to maintain social stability in the economy. The low share of investment income in China brings into sharp focus the poor performance of the financial sector to distribute profit income from firms to households, both in the form of dividends and interest.
China's stock market is relatively small despite the rise of private firms and the dilution of public ownership through listings in the stock market and through sales to foreign investors.
Data source: Aziz and Cui (2007) Until recently, about two thirds of the shares of the listed companies in China's stock market were During the late 1980s and the 1990s, households in most Chinese cities were offered the chance to purchase the apartments that they rented from the state, thereby untying access to housing from working in the state sector and giving urban residents a chance to become private homeowners.
These reforms were enacted in at least 50 cities, potentially affecting more than 90 million people.
Iyer, Meng and Qian (2009) Iyer, Meng and Qian (2009) present evidence that the housing privatization reform did not increase households ability to obtain credit, in keeping with the institutional setting in China.
Households are not more likely to have either a housing loan or a non7housing loan following the enactment of housing privatization reforms. Iyer, Meng and Qian (2009) also find that the estimated coefficients for the effect of the reform on total household consumption and expenditure on housing improvements are small, negative and statistically insignificant. All of this suggests that the reform did not significantly increase household wealth 8 .
Conclusion
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Consumer credit has decoupled from disposable income in mid 1990s when equity market growth rates have changed. Consumer credit has also decoupled from disposable income in 2000s when Glass-Steagall act has been repealed, which allowed banks to be involved in investment activity in sophisticated financial instruments which in turn made previously illiquid assets (real estate) liquid, therefore raising demand on such instrument and therefore their price. Increasing consumption in developed markets caused by reliance of consumers on equity markets as well as ability to withdraw equity from appreciating real estate has been at the core of consumer spending expansion. Consumer Credit has been increasing with consumer wealth, leaving CC/W ration stationary. Chinese have neither developed stock market to benefit from raising corporate profits via dividends nor bond market -they are limited to deposits which rates are depressed. Neither there is an ability to withdraw equity from housing as well as privatization did not result in increased wealth by the households. We conclude that disposable income by itself is not sufficient to fund increased consumption -neither there are any conditions for increased disposable income in China. In summary, consumer as the engine of economic growth is simply non7existent in China to the degree that it exists in US and this phenomenon has to do with economic structure 
